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I . Introducat ion
The role of services in global production and trade is
currently of great interest to governments, businessmen and
analysts. This interest is reflected, inter alia, in the fact
that for the first time ever services are on the agenda of a
global multilateral trade negotiation, the ongoing Uruguay Round.
The increasing attention given to services has led to a spate of
research on international transactions on services. The topics
investigated include the applicability of standard theories of
international trade to services; identification of barriers to
trade and investment: the effects of intervention and the
existence of gains from liberalization; as well as the relevance
of the trade policy concepts embodied in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1
This paper focuses on the last issue, and in particular on
the possibility and likely consequences of applying existing
antidumping (AD) rules and practices to trade in services. The
plan of the paper is as follows. Drawing on the existing
literature, Section II briefly reviews the economic effects of AD
actions. The focus is both on incentive effects ex ante (i.e.,
threat effects) and ex post. Section III turns to services, and
discusses what implications the distinguishing characteristics of
services have for AD policy. AD is, of course, allowed under
GATT rules, but the GATT applies virtually exclusively to goods.
Services differ from goods, and thus the question arises whether
these differences have implications for the applicability and
1 See Feketekuty (1988) and Stern and Hoekman (1987, 1988)
for a discussion of many of these issues and references to the
1iterature.
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desirability of AD policies. We conclude that difficulties of
measuring and observing services and the need for producer-
consumer proximity for services provision to be feasible are
likely to result in much greater scope for arbritrary outcomes in
services-related AD actions than in goods-related cases. Section
IV turns to policy implications, and argues that AD makes very
little sense in the services-context, and thus should not be
pursued. It then goes on to discuss what type of actions could
be taken if it was decided that procedures somewhat analogous to
AD should be applicable to trade in services. Concluding remarks
are in Section V.
II. Incentive Effects of AD: Background
2
Antidumping actions are allowed under GATT rules to counter
international price discrimination and/or selling below costs of
production when such behavior has injured, or threatens to
injure, domestic import-competing industries. Dumping occurs
when a firm prices a good lower in an export market than it does
in its home market (taking into account transport and related
costs). This shall be called price-dumping in what follows.
Alternatively, if the firm has no or insufficient home market
sales, or if sales in the domestic market take place at prices
which are below costs of production, dumping occurs if the export
price is less than the constructed value, or less than a
comparable price in a third country. Constructed value is
defined as the cost of production plus a reasonable addition for
selling cost and profit. Cost of production refers to what
2 This section is based in part on Iloekman and Leidy
(19819).
economists would call long run average total costs, and not
variable or marginal costs. If the export supply price is less
than the constructed value, dumping has occurred. To obtain
protection, import-competing industries must also show that they
are being injured by imports. However, the ("material") injury
standard that needs to be satisfied is not a precise one. It is
often argued that in practice, investigating agencies may have
substantial scope for discretion in. terms of determining both the
dumping margin and whether injury has occurred. In this Section,
we shall focus primarily on the systemic effects of AD, and not
on the procedures that are followed.3
There are a number of major incentive effects implied by the
existence of AD legislation. All of these act to distort the
behavior of both consumers and producers, but especially the
latter. The distortions of producer behavior include the
following. First, by adjusting domestic output an exporting firm
can trade off revenue in its home market against expected revenue
earned abroad in the event of an AD action. Under plausible
conditions it can be shown that when facing the threat of a
price-based AD investigation, a firm will have an incentive 
to
increase sales in the home market for any given level of total
production (Leidy and Hoekman, 1990). By doing this, the ex post
damage of an AD action -- if it occurs -- is reduced, as is the
probability of an affirmative dumping finding.
Furthermore, the existence of a price-based AD law implies
that for the exporting firm the expected marginal revenue in the
foreign market declines for any given level of exports. This
3 For discussions of the procedural aspects of AD actions,
see, for example, Caine (1981), Hindley (1988), Norall (1987),
and Vermulst (1987).
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occurs since the marginal revenue of output allocated to the
foreign market is zero in those states where the AD constraint
becomes binding. When the AD constraint is binding, pt._ants
variations in the volume of product shipped abroad can have no
effect on the revenue earned in that market ex-post. The firm,
therefore, has an incentive to reduce shipments to the foreign
market for any given level of total production and domestic
supply. Thus, the AD threat acts to reduce import competition.
Observe, however, that the extent to which import competition
declines is diminished to the extent that home-market sales are
increased consequent to the introduction of AD legislation.
Under an AD investigation based on constructed value, the
exporting firm will not be able to change domestic sales to
reduce the dumping margin. This is because long-run average
total costs are given and this is usually the basis for the
calculation of the dumping margin in such cases. Interestingly,
according to Messerlin (1999a), over 90% of recent EC cases
against developing countries were based on constructed value.
This statistic is consistent with the conclusion in Leidy and
Hfoekman (1990) that "there exists an incentive for import-
competing firms to signal their preference for AD investigations
that use an average-cost rule." It is sometimes argued that
constructed value based AD is more pernicious than price-based
investigations, both because the (potentially) affected exporter
has fewer options at his disposal to avoid AD actions, and
because they open the door to more ad hoc behavior on the part of
investigating agencies.4
In general, as AD legislation and procedures are quite
complex, there exists a possibility that AD can be used/abused by
investigating agencies to maximize the probability of an
5
Antidumping laws may be used by domestic firms to enforce
collusive behavior with foreign firms in the domestic market.
Recent research by Messerlin (1989b) and Staiger and Wolak (1989)
demonstrates that both in theory and in practice AD threats may
be used by imperfectly competitive domestic firms to increase
market share in periods of low demand while maintaining higher
(i.e., collusive) prices than would obtain otherwise. As the AD
threat tends to be a credible one (for reasons discussed in
Hoekman and Leidy, 1989), in theory this implies that such tacit
collusive outcomes can be maintained without having to actually
impose an AD duty. In general, the existence of an AD threat
increases the market power of domestic industries and can be
expected to result in an increase in their profits. However,
these increased profits are outweighed by greater losses to
consumers, so that from the perspective of national welfare the
country with AD legislation loses.
5
Another effect of AD threats is that foreign producers will
have an incentive to relocate productive facilities. The same
factors apply here as in the case where foreign direct investment
in the country imposing a tariff is motivated by locating behind
the "tariff wall." While causation is difficult to determine
empirically, anecdotal evidence is suggestive. For example,
apparently Japanese direct investment in the EC increased by 90%
affirmative finding. Such an approach may be driven in part by
broader political considerations. To the extent that such a
possibility exists, it obviously will influence the
attractiveness of initiating an AD case. Hindley (1988, 1989)
has made a case that such a situation has prevailed in the EC
context, in that EC investigation procedures in certain cases
appeared to be biased in terms of both finding dumping and
determining the dumping margin.
5 In this connection, see also the recent investigation by
Dixit (1988).
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in the year following the introduction of legislation intended to
deal with circumvention of AD duties through "screwdriver" or
assembly operations (de clercq, 1988). Additionally, as noted by
Webb (1987), AD also embodies incentives to shift production
facilities from one foreign location to another. In general, the
use of local content rules in conjunction with AD policies will
increase efficiency costs even more. One of the more
controversial recent developments on the AD-front has been a
expansion of the law in certain countries to cover components
(input dumping) and the establishment of minimum local content
rules. The EC "screwdriver-plant" regulation is again a
pertinent example. In general, the result of these production
location incentives is likely to be a reduction in competition
and more costly production, and thus higher prices for consumers.
The various incentive effects Identified- above imply that
the existence of a AD threat will induce an exporting firm to
react ex ante. Ex post, of course, if an AD action materializes,
affected firms will be severely constrained. It has been
calculated that three years after their imposition, AD measures
on average reduce import volumes from the affected countries by
about 40%.6 But, AD actions are discriminatory, and thus will
often not be effective once invoked. It is well known that
selective protection is usually porous protection, in that
incentives are created to circumvent the actions. Thus, the
effect is trade diversion and incentives to relocate production.
7
6 Messerlin (1989a). See also UNCTAD (1984).
7 On the ineffectiveness of discriminatory protection in
general, see Baldwin, (1982), Crandall (1987), de Melo and
Messerlin (1988), and Yoffie (1983). In the specific context of
AD, Messerlin (1989a) found for the EC trade diversion effects
(both intra- and extra-EC) were substantial.
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Because an AD action will hurt the affected exporter, a
credible AD threat may be sufficient inducement to persuade
exporters to agree to a VER. By doing so the exporter at least
is able to capture some of the VER-generated quota rents, while
the import-competing firms experience a (short-run) reduction in
competition. The problems of VERs are well known. They include
the fact that it is not a transparent form of protection and can
easily lead to cartelization and monopoly pricing. Of course,
these "problems" will be perceived as advantages by import-
competing firms.
8
In summary, a general effect of AD law is to make the world
trading environment more uncertain for the exporting firm. This
uncertainty leads exporters to recoil from export markets on the
margin. To reduce the chance of facing AD procedures, firms will
have a tendency to ship less product to the export market
(thereby putting upward pressure on the export price), increase
sales in the home market (putting downward pressure on the
domestic price, assuming a home market exists), avoid
underselling of import-competing producers, and relocate
productive facilities. The result of all this is that
competitive pressure is likely to be reduced as a direct
consequence of the existence of AD legislation.
9  
This conclusion
8 In this connection we can also note that AD is sometimes
used as a device to monitor existing VERs or minimum price
agreements. Steel provides an example. See UNCTAD (1984) and
Koulen (1988). Thus, not only can AD be used to enforce implicit
collusion (as discussed above), but it can also serve to enforce
explicit or formal anti-competitive arrangements.
9 ioekman and Leidy (1989). Because the effect of AD laws
(threats) and measures is to raise prices in the importing
market, this implies the creation of rents for producers paid by
consumers. In practice these rents can be quite large
(Messerlin, 1989a). It should also be noted that one outcome of
the price-fixing effect of AD laws is that firms will be
8
is strengthened by the recent literature focusing on the use
(abuse) of AD to enforce collusive arrangements in specific
industries.
III. Applying Current AD Rules to Services: Problems and
Likely Effects
The foregoing discussion has painted a rather negative
picture of the various possible effects of the existence of AD
legislation and its use. The question that then arises is
whether similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to the
possible application of AD to services.
1 0  
This is not a
hypothetical issue. For example, the European Community has
recently developed and used a regulation that focuses explicitly
on unfairly traded shipping services (Bellis et al., 1988). This
section will first review various ways in which services differ
from goods, and then go on to investigate the implications of
these differences for AD policy.
Generally, there are two major differences between goods and
services that are relevant in the context of this paper. First,
many services are intangible, and second, they are often not
storable. 1 1  The latter condition implies that consumers and
inhibited from competing on price, and will shift to competing on
quality.
10 We abstract from legal issues pertaining to whether
current procedures may be applied to services; whether the EC has
the competence to apply trade policy to services; etc. See, for
example, Timmermans (1988).
11 For an authoritative discussion on the differences
between goods and services, see Hill (1977). For those
unfamiliar with the issues arising in the context of
international transactions in services, useful references and a
review of the issues can be found in Feketekuty (1988), Sampson
and Snape (1985) and Stern and loekman (1987, 1988).
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producers often have to be close to each other both in space and
in time for provision or sale of a service to be feasible.
International transactions in services often must occur via
the local establishment of foreign firms in the market of the
consumer. The characteristics of services often imply that to be
provided or sold, the producer and the consumer need to be in
physical proximity to each other. That is, cross-border trade
analogous to trade in goods will not be possible. Instead,
either the provider will need to move to the location of the
demander, or vice versa.
1 2  As AD actions are focused explicitly
on the protection of domestic import-competing industries, in the
services-context the question must then be answered what should
be understood under "domestic industry" and under "imports."
Presently, foreign-owned firms that have established
themselves abroad are considered to be domestic firms for the
purposes of AD investigations, as the focus of AD is on injury
caused by dumped imports. Such an approach may not be feasible
for service industries. One possible constraint is normative.
What is the rationale for singling out services that can be
traded and exempting those that are provided via establishment?
This is a problem especially in those cases where cross-border,
"standard" trade is feasible, but some producers have decided to
establish abroad. Another possible constraint may be formed by
the multilateral agreement on services that is likely to emerge
from the Uruguay Round talks. One of the topics for discussion
there is how to define trade for purposes of an agreement. If
this includes sales by foreign affiliates, the implication might
be that actions equivalent to AD will have to focus on foreign
12 See Sampson and Snape (1985).
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producers, no matter where they are located, instead of on
imported products.
One problem with focusing on producers instead of products
is that there may be no convincing rationale for discriminating
between foreign firms that have established a local presence and
domestic firms. Presumably both types of firms will be subject
to the domestic antitrust or competition laws. Why then should
foreign-owned firms face the possibility of AD as well? It has
often been noted in the literature that antitrust and AD imply
differential standards of behavior for domestic as opposed to
international competition. These inconsistencies gain added
weight in the services-context. Another practical problem that
can be noted in this connection is that it will often be
difficult to determine the nationality of the producer,
especially in those cases where ownership is distributed across a
number of nationalities, including domestic residents. Problems
may arise in particular if a large proportion of the firm is
locally owned or if the firm is a joint venture.
The intangibility of many, if not most, services leads to
measurement difficulties that have implications for AD
procedures. In particular, it often will not be straightforward
to determine what the unit of output is that is being sold or
produced. While this is a problem in itself, it is likely to
make it very difficult to implement both cost- or price-based AD
investigations. This is because current procedures are based on
comparisons between unit prices charged in different markets, or
between unit prices and unit costs. Often it will be difficult
to establish unit costs or prices for the simple reason that it
may not be clear what is being sold. Frequently, the service
.............. _ ...... _
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that is sold is a bundle of activities or products. The most
obvious example is exports of tourism. Furthermore, this bundle
may be unique.'
It should be recognized that product differentiation tends
to be very prevalent for services, and thus there will often be
great scope or need for price discrimination. Frequently product
differentiation will occur because the services involved are
tailored to the needs of the customer. Many services require the
producer and the consumer to interact for the provision/sale of a
service to be feasible. Because consumers will have varying
characteristics, the implication is that the service products
involved will be differentiated almost by definition. Given that
many services will be unique, it will often be difficult, if not
impossible, to find a like product for purposes of comparison.
Difficulties are augmented by the fact that it frequently
will be difficult to establish objective criteria that allow the
quality of a service to be determined. Price-based AD
investigations are constrained to compare identical or like
products. In the goods context, in principle - if not always in
practice - this is usually not too difficult to do. For
services, however, such comparisons require not only that the
"unit problem" be resolved, but that units of equivalent quality
be compared. In practice this will be very problematical.
AD actions as currently imposed are product-specific,
where the product is usually defined very narrowly as one or a
number of tariff-line items of the commodity classification used
by a country. Such detail is not available in the context of
services. Indeed, the only source of comparable statistics on
trade in services is a nation's balance of payments. As is well
12
known, the level of aggregation employed in the balance of
payments is very high. Usually information only exists on
expenditures by travellers (travel), receipts and payments for
the transport of freight (shipment) and people (passenger
services), and flows associated with port services. All other
services transactions are frequently lumped together in one
residual category called "other goods, services, and income."
The dearth of detailed statistics is obviously a major constraint
on the accurate and objective application of AD actions against
foreign service producers.
1 3
A consequence of all of the issues that have just been
raised is that if AD is to be used on services, a constructed
value procedure is likely to be the only feasible one. However,
in following such an approach, not only do the problems
associated with identifying (measuring) the service "unit" have
to be confronted, but additional issues will arise that are
similar to those that are familiar from goods-related
investigations. Foremost among these is that economies of scale
will often be important in many service industries. Thus, fixed
costs often may be the major part of total costs, implying that
for a certain period prices charged may be below total average
costs. This is true especially in cases where learning curves
are steep. In that case, maximization of the discounted present
value of an expected profit stream may require pricing below
current cost, because current production yields not only output,
13 For a more extensive discussion of statistics on trade
and investment in services, see GATT (1989), Stern and lloekman
(1987) and loekman and Stern (1989).
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but also cost-reducing experience (i.e., learning).
1 4
The characteristics of services will make investigations
based on constructed values more difficult and complex than in
the case of goods. For example, the allocation of overhead to
particular activities may not be possible analytically, because
what is produced is often a bundle or joint product. Thus, ad
hoc rules of thumb may have to be employed in practice. In
general, it appears safe to conclude that the scope for
discretion on the part of investigating agencies in terms of
determining constructed value is likely to be substantial. This
will increase the probability of arbitrary and politically
motivated decisions with respect to determining the existence of
dumping and injury, as well as the size of the dumping and injury
margins. The likely result will be an increase in uncertainty
regarding market access, and an increase in the protectionist
effect of AD legislation.
The intangibility of services also imposes constraints on
possible instruments of protection as well as on procedures. In
the context of trade in goods, AD actions generally involve the
use of either border measures -- tariffs or quantitative
restrictions -- or (price) undertakings by the foreign suppliers.
Because of the distinguishing characteristics of most services-
- which often will induce provision of the service through means
of provider or consumer mobility -- these border measures
frequently cannot be employed readily when imposing service-
related protection. Thus, alternative instruments such as sales
taxes, prohibitions, or subsidies to domestic industries will
14 Gruenspecht (1988) has analyzed such a situation in the
dumping context.
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have to be used if the importing government wishes to impose
measures. The feasibility (effectiveness) of alternative
instruments will depend in part on the type of service involved,
particularly the number of alternative modes of delivery that
exist. Even where observable cross-border trade occurs, and thus
may be reduced by a border measure such as a tax, a quantitative
restriction, or a prohibition, such intervention may not be
effective if alternative modes of delivery can be employed.
For a number of service sectors it may be quite difficult to
impose restrictions on foreign supplied products or sales by
foreign owned firms. If trade cannot be observed, intervention
will have to focus on sales of the service product (i.e., a tax
on consumption) or the activity of producing the service (i.e., a
tax on production). However, it may not be feasible to
distinguish sales or production of domestic firms from sales or
production of foreign-owned firms. Also, specific targetting of
new entrants and firms experiencing rapid growth will have a
discriminatory effect, in that it exempts those foreign firms
that established themselves far enough in the past. As-mentioned
previously, a general problem is that it may be difficult to
distinguish firms using a nationality of ownership criterion, as
many firms may be joint ventures or be partly owned by domestic
residents.
In conclusion, the application of current AD procedures is
likely to lead to many difficulties. In conjunction with the
conclusion of Section II that AD policies are likely to lead to
numerous distortions, this suggests that attempts to apply AD in
the services context are likely to be even more detrimental to
national welfare than is the case at present.
15 16
IV. Should an AD Policy be Designed for Services?
The original theoretical rationale for AD law can be found
in Viner (1923). lie argued that AD authority may be needed to
protect domestic consumers from predatory (anti-competitive)
dumping. The fear was that a foreign firm (or cartel) might
deliberately price products low enough to drive existing domestic
firms out of business, then establish a monopoly. Once
established, the monopolist could more than recoup its losses by
exploiting the resulting market power.
As noted by lioekman and Leidy (1989), for this scenario to
occur, the monopolist (cartel) must not only be able to eliminate
domestic competition, it must establish a lg.lokal dominance.
Thus, the multinational firm(s) involved must price low in all
markets, and be able to deal with the responses of all
competitors (price war, for example) during the predation period.
Further, even if all competitors worldwide were driven out of
business, the predator must be able to prohibit entry in the
future.
1 5  
Such barriers to entry usually require the support of
a government regulatory agency. It is difficult to conceive of
the necessary conditions for predation to be met in most
industries, and in practice cases of successful predatory dumping
remain virtually undocumented.
1 6
More often than not, the predation argument is not the
raison d'etre for AD that is invoked by governments. Instead, AD
is usually seen by governments as an appropriate response to what
15 In the case of a cartel, another necessary requirement is
that it remains stable. In practice, this requirement has often
been difficult to meet for any substantial length of time.
16 See, for example, Koller (1971) and OECD (1989).
is considered to be an "unfair" trading practice. That is,
dumping per se is seen to be unfair. No attention is usually
given to why the dumping occurs. We would argue that if dumping
is driven only by market forces this cannot be regarded as
unfair. Presumably, a necessary condition for unfairness to
arise is that foreign exporting firms benefit from an environment
that is created or sustained by policies of their government,
while such policies are not available to domestic
import-competing firms. The implication is that foreign firms
need to. be "subsidized" in some fashion by their governments (or,
alternatively, that domestic firms are burdened by "taxes" that
do not affect foreign exporters). For example, if dumping is
made possible because foreign exporting firms are sheltered from
competition in their home market or benefit from tariffs or NTBs,
this could conceivably be viewed as forms of "unfair"
(off-budget) aid, Alternatively, foreign exporting firms may
benefit from direct subsidies, and perhaps indirect subsidies of
various sorts.
It should be noted that these are necessary, and not
sufficient conditions for "unfairness" to occur. There may not
be any discernable effect on trade at all. It is necessary to be
very careful regarding the meaning ascribed to "unfair." In
particular, it by no means implies that the policies are contrary
to the rules of the GATT. This would obviously depend on the
specific policies employed. In the services context, where there
is no multilateral agreement concerning trade and domestic
policies, what is considered to be unfair by one country may very
well be considered as perfectly legitimate by another country.
We shall return to this issue below.
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The point is that some type of on- or off-budget aid may be
the cause of the market segmentation that allows price- or cost-
dumping to occur. Thus, when governments speak of unfair trade
in the context of dumping, they presumably refer to exports that
benefit from "market segmenting" policies. This is unambiguous
in the goods context, as such market segmentation is a necessary
condition for dumping to occur. Without such separation of
markets, arbitrage would ensure that prices across markets are
harmonized. In the services context, however, markets will be
segmented in any case, whether there is government intervention
or not. This is because arbitrage across markets is usually not
feasible due to the nonstorable nature of most services. Thus,
as mentioned earlier, price discrimination is always an option
for individual service providers, as they will price according to
the elasticity of demand of consumers in the different markets.
The implication of this is that it will be much more
difficult to argue and to demonstrate that dumping of services is
the result of explicit or implicit market segmenting policies,
given that markets are separated in any event. Nevertheless,
government policies may help to further segment markets. If the
government of the service exporter restricts participation of
foreign providers of comparable services, this is likely to
reduce the elasticity of demand facing the service provider in
its home market. In general, fewer substitutes implies a lower
elasticity of demand, and thus higher prices. Hence, if the
service exporter's government restricts the participation (market
access) of competing service providers, this enhances the
likelihood that dumping will occur. Note, however, that the
distortion in this case is different from the one that arises in
18
the goods context. In the case of goods, government action
inhibits arbitrage from occuring, while in the services context
intervention has a more indirect effect.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that government
intervention in the exporting country has induced dumping,
however difficult it may be in practice to prove this. There are
then two questions: (1) should there be a reaction to these
distortions; and (2) if the answer is affirmative, what form
should the reaction take. Whether one should react depends on
whether this will increase the importing country's economic
welfare. To the extent that dumping is occurring, it is not
clear that this will be the case. Given that intervention is
likely to lead to an increase in prices, consumers of the product
in question will lose, while domestic producers will gain.
Numerous empirical studies have shown that in most cases the loss
to consumers tends to greatly outweigh the loss to producers.
Over time, these static losses will be augmented by the
concomfnittant reduction in competition, incentives to innovate,
etc.
1 7
The biggest losers of artificially induced or sanctioned
dumping .are likely to be the exporting country's consumers.
Removal of the distortions that allow dumping would usually
17 In principle the action taken by foreign governments may
result in a transfer of the importing country's consumer surplus
and a net increase in foreign welfare. This can occur if an
export cartel is formed, for example (Caves, 1979). Such a
situation may lead to price-dumping if a small part of the
cartels output is allocated to its home market. However, in this
case it is not the dumping as such that is a problem. Instead,
the problem is the market power that is exerted by the exporters.
19
increase the welfare of the exporting country.
1 8 
Furthermore, it
would benefit third parties as well, as the resulting
reallocation of resources would in the longer run increase the
country's income and trade.
Invoking AD in response to dumping that is caused by the
policies of the exporting firms government is clearly
ill-conceived. AD is an inferior instrument to remedy the
"unfair" practice because it does not address the source of the
problem, i.e., those policies which artificially foster such
pricing. To the extent that government induced international
price discrimination is considered to be a problem, what is
required is that policy changes be implemented at home and abroad
that will reduce the scope for it. An AD duty can do little to
achieve this end. Even if it could, currently AD investigations
in the goods-context do not distinguish between dumping that
occurs as a result of government intervention and dumping that is
simply the optimal pricing strategy for the foreign exporting
firms in a given undistorted market environment. While no
information exists regarding the proportion of dumping that is
due to government intervention and the proportion that is purely
market driven, we expect that even in the absence of intervention
dumping of goods will be widespread. There are numerous
situations where market forces will make dumping optimal at some
point in time (Hoekman and Leidy, 1989). While the issue is an
empirical one, and there is clearly great scope for research on
this question, once the focus moves to services it becomes much
more difficult to separate out the effects of government actions.
18 Except possibly in the case of monopolistic exporter or
an export cartel.
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Indeed, it may be impossible in practice. In any event, as
argued above, it will rarely be the sole cause of dumping.
Insofar as the underlying problem is market segmentation due
to government intervention, the best solution from a world
welfare perspective is for the exporter's home government to
alter its policies. For example, it could use its anti-trust law
to break a monopoly or cartel, or be induced to reduce the level
of protection accorded to import-competing industries. As far as
services are concerned, the "problem" will usually be due to
differences in the regulatory environment. A possibility could
then be to attempt to harmonize regulations in the longer run.
1 9
The political problem, of course, is how to induce the foreign
government to follow this route. The most obvious approach is to
negotiate directly with the governments concerned.
A constraint on harmonization and bilateral negotiations
will be differences in opinion regarding the effect and
"legitimacy" of specific policies. Therefore, multilateral
agreement on such issues and the approach in general is likely to
be required. A major benefit of multilateral negotiations is
that it allows parties to agree on which actions of governments
might induce dumping to occur. However, it is clear that such
negotiations should not be limited to this. Instead, governments
should attempt to agree on the broader questions of what
constitutes "unfair" intervention.
AD is incapable of addressing the underlying determinants of
"unfair" dumping (sources of "unfairness"), i.e., government-
sanctioned market segmentation and/or international price
19 Additionally, attempts could be made to mobilize foreign
consumers by informing them about the cost of artificially
segmenting international markets.
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discrimination. This is the case irrespective of whether the
producers or industries sell goods or services. Of course,
government intervention and regulation tends to be more prevalent
and more stringent for services than for goods-producing
industries. However, this does not mean that there will be
greater need for AD-type "unfair" trade actions. One reason is
that many services will require either long term or temporary
establishment of providers in the consuming country. Firms that
establish will be subjected to domestic regulations, so that
regulatory discrepancies are not relevant. 20
The conclusion we draw from the foregoing discussion is that
it will be very, difficult to apply current AD procedures to
services, that there are no convincing rationales to do so, and
thus that no attempts in that direction should be undertaken.
The best approach would be for governments to agree
multilaterally on what types of policies should be prohibited
and/or countervailable. Even if such an agreement were to emerge
in the near future, the approach suggested here might not be
followed.
2
1 Also, achieving multilateral agreement will clearly
be a long run affair. Thus, from a practical perspective the
question remains as to what policymakers could do if it were to
be decided that action analogous to AD should be possible in the
case of services.
The problem is what to do in cases where cross-border trade
occurs and the governments of foreign exporters create conditions
20 This presumes that countries follow a policy of national
treatment. Of course, in practice this will not necessarily be
the case.
21 Negotiations are currently underway in the context of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
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allowing "unfair" pricing to occur. If, for whatever reason, the
approach suggested above is not considered to be. feasible, a
trade policy response to "unfair" practices would be a second
best approach. 2 2 The goal is then simply to protect the affected
industry from trade-related injury, whether this is due to unfair
practices (however defined) or not. To the extent that it was
considered desirable that trade policies be applicable to
services, it is important that procedures be designed to ensure
that intervention is in a nation's interest. Services often play
an important support and infrastructure role in the functioning
of an economy. Transportation, storage, telecommunications, and
distribution services are frequently crucial in linking producers
to each other and to consumers. The implication of- this is that
trade policy actions affecting services are likely to have a
greater impact on the economy as a whole than actions that
pertain to imports of goods. The important linkage and support
role of many services implies that it would be very beneficial
for nations to investigate the potential effects of intervention
in trade. More in particular, the benefits of a public inquiry
that focuses on the economy-wide effects of proposed intervention
are likely to be quite high. It can be argued that once
established, the foreign-owned firm will to all intents and
purposes become domestic, as it will create domestic employment,
produce domestic value added, and pay domestic taxes. Thus, once
established, trade polices should no longer be applicable to
these firms.
There are always pressures for protection, and governments
22 As discussed previously, although trade policy is a sub-
optimal instrument in this context, AD is a sub-optimal trade
policy.
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should be able to intervene. However, intervention should occur
in a transparent manner and not be subject to spurious, criteria
such as dumping. Before undertaking action it is necessary: (1)
to determine what could be acceptable criteria (necessary
conditions for intervention); arid (2) to determine whether
intervention or aid is in the interest of the community as a
whole. The main policy concern should be to design procedures to
deal with trade-related injury in an efficient (i.e., least
costly) manner.
2 3  
Following such an approach has implications
for research strategies. There is an extensive literature on the
theory of optimal intervention. However, this literature has
never had much of an impact on policy, in large part because the
informational requirements for determining and implementing the
optimal policy can rarely be satisfied in the "real" world. What
is needed is more research on the design of rules for contingent
protection that could be applied in practice, as well as the
(incentive) effects of various rules. Furthermore, research
could fruitfully focus on the "realities" of a political economy
nature that constrain policymakers in both the domestic and the
multilateral setting. Often it is not enough to determine what
policies could improve on the status quo, but analysis needs to
address how such policies could be agreed to or negotiated.
Should there be any criteria for intervening in addition to
economy-wide injury (national interest)? Focusing on predation
or predatory intent is not very useful. Rules focusing on
predatory pricing are likely to inhibit the price competition
that is fundamental to the efficient operation of markets.
23 An initial attempt to address issues of this sort can be
found in Hoekman and Leidy (191).
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Indeed, pricing below cost (be it total average costs, variable
costs, or even marginal cost) will often not be predatory. In
general, if predation is to be the ground for intervention,
policies should focus on preventing firms from achlhving
excessive market power. That is, the incentives to seek to
establish a monopoly, be it via a predatory pricing strategy or
via alternative means such as collusion, should be minimized.
This is a general conclusion to be drawn, as it holds whether
there is predatory intent or not. In the literature it is
sometimes proposed that in general the appropriate procedure to
combat anti-competitive behavior resulting from a. strategy of
predatory pricing is through anti-trust laws.
2 4  
Such
recommendations can be troublesome to implement, however, as they
assume that problems related to extraterritorial enforcement can
be overcome. But, antitrust laws are likely to be easier to
apply to services than to goods. Again, the reason is that many
services require the producer to maintain a local presence, which
makes it easier for them to be subjected to competition laws.
In addition to economy-wide injury, it could be required
that injury be due to actions undertaken by the exporting
country's government. This would imply that the goal is not just
to protect domestic industry, but also to deal with attempts by
governments to shift profits to their countries (along the lines
of the new "strategic trade policy"). Of course, small economies
will not be able to do much about such practices if they are
undertaken by large countries. This points again to the need for
multilateral agreement on what policies could be actionable. It
also points to the need for multilateral enforcement of
24 See, for example, Yarrow (1987) and Grey (1986).
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agreements. However, this is a subject that is beyond the scope only. Criteria such as dumping should not be imposed.
of this paper.
V. Concluding-Remarks
In conclusion, AD is an inferior instrument of trade
intervention. Its possible application to service industries
raises many new difficulties. If current AD procedures were to
be applied to international transactions in services, it is clear
that there is great scope for arbitrary and politically
determined outcomes, rent-seeking, and controversy. Using
antitrust and competition laws to deal with potential problems of
predatory pricing should, in principle, often be possible in the
context of services, because providers will frequently need to
move to the location of the consumer. Indeed, to the extent that
foreign firms establish themselves in the domestic market, trade
policy should no longer be applied to them as they will be
subject to domestic regulations and laws. Trade policy is not an
efficient or effective instrument to deal with problems
underlying dumping, i.e., government actions that allow exporters
to dump. It is better to address the source of the perceived
problem directly, via negotiations for example. However, such
discussions will have to go beyond dumping per se, as this is
only one possible result of government induced market
segmentation. In any event, our expectation is that in many
cases dumping will simply be a rational strategy of exporting
firms in a given market environment, and not a consequence of
government intervention. This will certainly be the case for
most services. To the extent that it is felt necessary to use
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